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Time provides essential structure to human experience. In this 
chapter we review the available empirical evidence for a fundamental 
metaphoric structure such as TIME IS SPACE in figurative language and 
thought. The chapter is organized into three over-arching themes: Motion 
through time, that is, the influence of ego-moving metaphors (motion of the 
observer’s context along a timeline) and time-moving metaphors (motion of 
events along a timeline) on the construal of time as moving or stationary; 
Temporal succession, and how it is conceptualized on the specific spatial 
axes (horizontal and/or vertical) used to sequence events in time; and lastly, 
temporal duration, focusing on the metaphors used to describe the temporal 
extension of an event and their influence on the perception of duration. A 
large part of the experimental evidence lends support to the psychological 
reality of the TIME IS SPACE metaphor, revealing the inextricable link 
between conceptual metaphor in language and fundamental thinking 
processes like perception of temporal succession and time estimation, 
contributing to the emerging broader picture of the powerful role of 
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linguistic experience in shaping the way conceptual representations are 
formed and activated. At the same time, the review also reveals that 
linguistic space-time mappings may be overridden by cultural conventions. 
Taken together, the evidence available to date suggests that the mental 
representation of time in humans is the outcome of an intricate interplay 
between linguistic (i.e. metaphors) and cultural factors, calling for further 
exploration of this interplay through empirical research. 
 
Keywords: time perception, duration estimation, experimental cognitive 
linguistics 
 
Introduction 
 
Time is an ever-present dimension of human life. Our experience of reality 
is permeated by the order in which events occur and the extent to which 
they last, be they small scale (e.g. the passing of a minute, arriving late) or 
large scale (e.g. the passing of seasons, cycle of life). The centrality of time 
in human life is reflected, among other things, in our efforts to keep track of 
time (clocks, calendars etc.), to grasp the very essence of time (cf. the early 
philosophical treatises of time by Aristotle, Plato, St Augustine, and Vedic 
writers), and not least in our endeavour to make the most out of the time 
available to us. Time being so central to human experience, language offers 
a wide range of lexical and grammatical means to express temporal relations 
(e.g. Comrie 1976, 1985; Dahl 1985; Evans 2013). A significant trait of 
much temporal language is that it relies on analogies from another 
fundamental domain of human experience: space. Consider the following 
examples: 
 
(1) The concert was pushed back  The wheel was pushed 
back 
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Spring break lies ahead   The landing strip lies  
ahead 
The dinner was very long  The road was very long 
The rehearsal was too short  The rope was too short 
 
These sentences illustrate that events with temporal reference are 
encoded in the same way as spatial events, thus showing that basic time 
concepts such as succession and duration are expressed through spatial 
language (e.g. Casasanto and Boroditsky 2008; Clark 1973; Evans 2004, 
2013; Jackendoff 1983; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Moore 2006; Traugott 
1978). The existence of these spatio-temporal metaphors raises the 
important question of whether we use space to construe and understand 
concepts of time. In their seminal publication on conceptual metaphors, 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) posit the metaphor TIME IS SPACE, thus 
suggesting that our mental representation of time is indeed based on spatial 
representations. While spatio-temporal metaphors have been subject to 
extensive debate and analyses in cognitive linguistics, it is more recently 
that experimental research has sought to elucidate the cognitive 
consequences of such metaphors. The introduction of experimental 
paradigms in the study of spatio-temporal metaphors is motivated from at 
least two points of view: first of all, probing the psychological reality of 
spatio-temporal metaphors represents an important development in testing 
the limits of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (henceforth CMT). As Lakoff 
and Johnson point out in later editions of their 1980 publication, other data 
than “linguistic forms and inferences” (2003: 249) are necessary to 
ultimately demonstrate a relationship between metaphors and mental 
representation. Second, investigating the role of spatio-temporal metaphors 
in time construal has important implications for the study of linguistic 
relativity. Even though most languages use spatio-temporal metaphors, there 
is considerable crosslinguistic variation in the specific spatial configurations 
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contained in these metaphors. Thus, to the extent that spatio-temporal 
metaphors influence the construal of time, speakers whose languages 
convey temporal relations differently should exhibit different mental 
representations 
In this chapter we review the available empirical evidence for a 
fundamental metaphoric structure such as TIME IS SPACE in figurative 
language and thought. In accordance with Lakoff and Johnson (2003), and 
more recently, scholars within cognitive psychology (e.g. Casasanto, 
Boroditsky), we draw a distinction between linguistic and mental 
representation of time. The former refers to the specific (spatial) 
configurations used to express time in language. While studying this level of 
representation permits the postulation of hypotheses on the role of spatial 
frames for temporal cognition, it is in and of itself insufficient to draw firm 
conclusions about actual cognitive temporal behaviour (using linguistic data 
as a basis for both hypothesis and conclusion would be circular). The mental 
representation of time, conversely, is defined along a continuum of 
cognitive behaviours that (i) do not involve overt speech production, and (ii) 
have an inherent element of categorization (e.g. higher-level, conscious 
cognitive processes such as categorical judgments, estimations, sorting). 
The specific question we ask is to what extent mental temporal 
representation is isomorphic to time-space mappings in language. 
The chapter is organized into three over-arching (and to some extent 
overlapping) themes: Motion through time, that is, the influence of ego-
moving metaphors (motion of the observer’s context along a timeline) and 
time-moving metaphors (motion of events along a timeline) on the construal 
of time as moving or stationary; the specific spatial axes (horizontal and/or 
vertical) used to sequence events in time and their consequences on the 
construal of temporal succession; and lastly, the metaphors used to describe 
the temporal extension of an event and their influence on the perception of 
duration. 
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Motion through time 
 
Boroditsky’s (2000) study was one of the first to empirically investigate the 
hypothesis that abstract concepts come to be represented through 
metaphorical mappings from more concrete, experiential domains, as Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980) proposed. The study was a response to the non-existent 
experimental research on CMT at the time, and moreover an attempt to test 
the operationalizability of CMT. Boroditsky aimed to explain the 
acquisition, representation, and use of abstract metaphor, to look for 
psychological evidence of cross-domain mappings, and see if alternative 
theories can account for findings. In this way, Boroditsky aimed to develop 
what she termed the Metaphoric Structuring View as derived from Lakoff 
and Johnson’s theory. Specifically, the Metaphoric Structuring View holds 
that “metaphors are used for organizing information within abstract 
domains” and are “imported” from a more concrete domain (2000: 3).  For 
the subject of spatio-temporal metaphors (which the paper focuses on), she 
proposes that “…aspects of time that are specified through spatial 
metaphors will be shaped by the metaphors used (…)” (2000: 4). Boroditsky 
raises two versions of this hypothesis: 
 
a. Weak version: through frequent use, spatial metaphors of time come to be 
represented in the domain of time itself.  
b. Strong version: thinking about time requires spatial schemas. 
 
The two main metaphors of time (in English) are ego-moving and time-
moving (e.g. ‘we are coming up to Christmas’ vs. ‘Christmas is coming’). 
Psychological evidence for these distinct conceptual schemas comes from a 
cost for switching between them. For example, travellers at an airport who 
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were primed with an ego-moving metaphor (e.g. “is Boston ahead or behind 
us time-wise?”) were faster to respond correctly to a follow-up (target) 
question using the same ego-moving metaphor type (“So should I turn my 
watch forward or back?”) than if they were primed with a time-moving 
metaphor instead (e.g. “Is it earlier or later in Boston than it is here?”) 
(Gentner, Imai, and Boroditsky 2002). Converging evidence, Boroditsky 
proposes, comes from a study by McGlone and Harding (1998) which gave 
participants ambiguous statements such as “The meeting originally 
scheduled for next Wednesday has been moved forward two days” and 
asked them when the event in question would occur. Participants who were 
primed with ego-moving metaphors tended to answer “Friday” and 
participants who were primed with time-moving metaphors tended to 
answer “Monday”. Using a similar paradigm, Boroditsky sought to reveal 
whether priming spatial metaphors could impact the way participants 
thought about time. Specifically, participants completed a questionnaire 
with spatial scenarios that primed either ego-moving or object-moving 
frames of reference and required “true” or “false” responses immediately 
prior to seeing the ambiguous sentence above (“next Wednesday’s meeting 
has been moved forward two days”). Participants subsequently indicated on 
which day the meeting would occur. The results showed that 71.3% of 
participants responded to the test question in a manner consistent with the 
metaphor structure that they had been primed with (ego-moving priming led 
to more “Friday” responses and object-moving priming led to more 
“Monday” responses). Participants in the control condition (only the target 
question, without primes) did not perform reliably differently from chance. 
Boroditsky argues from these results that spatial schemas influence thinking 
about time. 
Although Boroditsky’s (2000) findings provide empirical evidence 
for the psychological reality of spatially grounded construal of time, the 
spatial primes used in the experiment were both linguistic and pictorial (i.e. 
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sentences accompanied by pictures). It is therefore unclear whether the 
observed effect is due to priming from language per se, from the visual 
schematization of the sentence, or from both. For example, it is entirely 
possible that any effects of this experiment might disappear if they were no 
longer ‘filtered’ through language first. This is particularly important in 
light of the fact that the grammatical structure of the priming sentences in 
the ego-moving and object-moving conditions (e.g. “The flower is in front 
of me” vs. “the flower is in front of the hat box”) could have primed similar 
thematic relations for the agents and themes in the grammatical structures in 
the target questions, in a manner independent of metaphor structure. This 
would be very hard to prove, since sentences of the type ‘the x is in front of 
the y’ are superficially identical whether used in ego-moving or time-
moving schemas.  
In a second experiment, Boroditsky (2000) asked if the reverse is 
true – time priming spatial thinking. Evidence of a two-way relationship 
would be consistent with the “strong” view of Metaphoric Structuring that 
sees representations of time as necessarily dependent on space. 
Alternatively, representations of time could become independent from the 
spatial domain through frequent use. Finally, one-dimensional time could 
simply be informationally insufficient for spatial representations that are 
plotted in two or three dimensions. In experiment 2 participants again 
answered ambiguous questions in a questionnaire, this time about temporal 
or spatial scenarios, after being primed with ego-moving or time/object-
moving metaphors. Spatial schemas (ego-moving or object-moving) primed 
target questions about time, and time schemas (ego-moving or time-moving) 
primed target questions about space. Two control groups did either spatial 
primes before a spatial target question or temporal primes before a temporal 
target question. Results showed that spatial schemas primed temporal 
schemas, and both control tasks (space priming space and time priming 
time) also showed above-chance levels of schematic consistency in 
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responses to target questions. However, temporal schemas did not prime 
responses to spatial target questions. Boroditsky argues that this is 
consistent with the “weak” view of Metaphoric Structuring that temporal 
schemas do not necessarily influence thinking about space, and space is 
therefore not necessary in thinking about time (otherwise time would always 
prime space). 
However, in this experiment the spatial primes were represented by 
pictures with captions (like in experiment 1), whereas the time primes were 
sentences only using calendric information (e.g. days of the week) as a 
‘fulcrum’ for schematizations. Thus the spatial primes: (i) were more 
immediately visually available in pre-schematized format; (ii) existed in 
more than one modality (visual, verbal); and (iii) were not anchored in 
culturally-shared information such as the days of the week. Although it is 
not obvious as to whether this would make the spatial primes more or less 
potent than the temporal ones, if the answer is ‘more’ then the time/space 
asymmetry reported could be a result of this imbalance. This is not 
necessarily a methodological confound. The space domain, by virtue of its 
concrete nature, is more readily multimodal in its realisation (i.e. both 
verbal and visual) than the more abstract time domain, and this very fact 
may be the root of the asymmetry, and by extension, of the spatial 
grounding of time: talking about something abstract (time) is more 
vulnerable to priming from something concrete that can be represented both 
visually and verbally (space) than vice versa. 
In experiment 3, Boroditsky (2000) wished to look at the on-line 
processing of schemas rather than the result of their processing. She also 
sought to test the possibility that both temporal and spatial schemas adopt 
‘broader’ domain-independent schemas and are not specific to these 
domains at all (she calls this the Generic Schema View). Such a view would 
propose that time is not thought of in terms of space, but that both domains 
recruit this Generic Schema View. It could also be, she argues, that the 
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asymmetric priming effects of spatial and temporal schemas could be due to 
spatial schemas being more strongly associated with this more generalised 
frame of reference. Boroditsky notes that if the Generic Schema View is 
correct, then space should prime time even more strongly than time might 
prime itself, since space has the more ‘direct’ relationship with the schema 
that serves both. In the experiment, participants received two primes 
followed by a target, but this time their responses to the target were timed. 
The format was again a 2 x 2 time/space prime/target crossed design (as 
experiment 2). Boroditsky predicted that, if the Generic Schema View is 
correct, then spatial primes rather than temporal primes should lead to faster 
response times on temporal target questions. Additionally, the “weak” 
Metaphoric Structuring view would again predict that although we use 
space to think about time, space is not necessary to think about time – hence 
a similar priming asymmetry to that found in experiment 2 might be 
observed. Results showed that participants were faster to respond “true” to a 
target scenario when the prime was consistent with the domain of the target 
(time for time, space for space) than when it was not (space for time, time 
for space), across both ego-moving and object/time-moving schemas. 
Consistent with the “weak” version of Metaphoric Structuring, spatial 
information primed faster responses on temporal targets, but temporal 
information did not prime spatial targets. Contrary to the Generic Schema 
View, time primed itself more than space primed time. 
Núñez, Motz, and Teuscher (2006) extended Boroditsky’s (2000) 
empirical approach whilst proposing a novel theoretical framework that 
departs from the traditional division between ego-moving and time-moving 
metaphors of time, where the ego moves through time, or time moves in 
relation to the ego. Firstly, Núñez and colleagues point out that non-
dynamic spatial metaphors of time also exist, which treat times as locations 
(e.g. “the appointments are too close together”). They ask whether a ‘thing 
that moves’ is really a requirement for spatial metaphors of time as a result. 
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Secondly, they argue that in sentences such as “Wednesday follows 
Tuesday”, no ego reference point is required. Thirdly, they point out that 
some expressions require no sense of what is ‘future’ or ‘past’ either, such 
as (again) “Wednesday follows Tuesday”, which is true whether it is a past 
week or a future week in question. Such expressions require no anchoring in 
the ‘now’. Instead, Núñez et al. posit Ego-Reference-Point (Ego-RP) and 
Time-Reference-Point (Time-RP) metaphors. Both ego-moving and time-
moving metaphors would be subsumed under Ego-RP, whereas Time-RP 
incorporates earlier/later (or anteriority/posteriority) relationships with no 
requirement for a ‘now’/ego anchor. 
In experiment 1 the researchers aimed to uncover evidence of the 
psychological reality of this division of spatio-temporal metaphors. 
Participants saw frontless objects (boxes) moving in a line on a horizontal 
plane (not approaching or receding with respect to the observer). 
Participants were asked some questions regarding the display. For example, 
participants were asked what colour the box ‘in front’ was. This session was 
designed to prime Time-RP conceptual mappings. After this priming 
session, participants were given one of two target questions, much like 
Boroditsky’s (2000), but this time the target could be in the past or the 
future: 
 
a. Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward 2 days. On what day 
will the meeting now take place? 
 
Or 
 
b. Last Wednesday’s meeting had been moved forward 2 days. On what day 
did the meeting take place? 
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Data were compared to Boroditsky’s (2000) unprimed condition for the 
same target question (present tense) and it was found that participants gave 
significantly more ‘Monday’ answers than ‘Friday’ answers than the chance 
levels reported in Boroditsky’s study, regardless of whether the sentence 
referred to a past or future time. The researchers conclude that an ego is not 
an essential ingredient in the disambiguation of spatio-temporal metaphor.  
Experiment 2 largely replicated experiment 1, but the boxes in the 
priming task were made two-dimensional in order to avoid any potential 
inclusion of the ego by means of representing a three dimensional space, 
and a control condition showed a static array of the same boxes. 
Additionally, participants were asked a new question that replicated the old 
‘meeting’ sentence but substituted hours for days. The results confirmed the 
findings of experiment 1. The primed group gave significantly more 
‘earlier’ responses than ‘later’ ones for both past and future sentences and 
‘day’ and ‘hour’ versions of the target. Participants in the control condition 
did not perform differently from chance. 
Rothe-Wulf, Beller, and Bender’s more recent (2014) study 
examined the psychological reality of the TIME IS SPACE metaphor cross-
linguistically. The authors begin by highlighting the apparent ambiguity in 
US English of the sentence “Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward 
two days”. The problem, they say, is that there is no frame of reference 
without recourse to other, possibly cultural information. The researchers 
aimed to look at cross-linguistic differences in responses in German, 
Swedish, and US English speakers. They also, uniquely, wished to 
investigate consistency in individual responses. Rothe-Wulf et al. define 
frame of reference as a “coordinate system that allows one to identify 
relationships between two entities” (2014: 3). They distinguish between 
temporal frames of reference (t-FoRs), which include absolute, intrinsic, and 
relative frames, and spatial frames of reference (s-FoRs), which also include 
absolute, intrinsic, and relative frames. Absolute frames locate a Figure in 
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reference to a Ground in the context of an oriented field outside of the 
Figure and Ground. For space, the field is space itself, which could be 
oriented in terms of the 4 points of the horizon (north, south, east, west), or 
the direction of another physical entity on which Figure and Ground are 
located (e.g. the flow of a river, the direction of a moving vehicle, etc.). For 
time, the field would be time itself. Absolute frames are similar to the 
termed ‘ego-moving’ perspective. Intrinsic frames locate Figure in relation 
to Ground on the basis of the orientation of Ground itself (thus Ground 
needs a ‘front’). A typical Ground is a human. This roughly corresponds to 
‘time-moving’ perspectives. Rothe-Wulf et al. point out that there is debate 
over how events in time can be seen as ‘fronted’, although the beginning of 
a time event is a good candidate for such a front. Relative frames locate a 
Figure in relation to a Ground according to a Viewpoint. Levinson (2003) 
divided spatial frames into translation, reflection and rotation types. In 
reflection, the Viewpoint is reflected in the Ground so that ‘front’ is what is 
between the Viewpoint and the Ground. The authors give the example of the 
word arrière (‘behind’) in French for great-grandparents and great-
grandchildren, and the tendency to schematize moving forwards as 
‘pastwards’ or ‘futurewards’ depending on whether the event was in the past 
or is yet to come in some speakers of Tongan (an Austronesian language: 
see Bender, Beller, and Bennardo 2010). In translation, Viewpoint is shifted 
into Ground, so ‘front’ is what lies beyond Ground. Rotation does not relate 
to one-dimensional time, and is not elaborated upon as a result. 
In spatial references of time, a number of factors can bring to bear 
on the frame of reference that might be taken for a given scenario. 
Experiment 1 sought to assess preferences in temporal frames of reference 
in Swedish, German, and US English speakers and the consistency of 
preferences in individual speakers. Two pairs of two questions were asked 
in a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. The first pair used days of the week: 
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a. The concert scheduled for Thursday last week was moved forward two 
days. On which day of the week did it actually take place? 
b. The meeting scheduled for Wednesday next week will be moved forward 
two days. On which day of the week will it now take place? 
 
The second used hours rather than days: 
 
a. The power cut scheduled for 4 p.m. yesterday was moved forward three 
hours. At what time did it actually take place? 
b. The departure scheduled for 9 a.m. tomorrow will be moved forward three 
hours. At what time will it now take place? 
 
Frame of reference choices were assessed as follows: 
 
a. Absolute   =  movement futurewards 
b. Intrinsic   =  movement pastwards 
c. Relative (reflective)  =  futurewards if event in past, pastwards if  
     event in future 
d. Relative (translation)  =  pastwards if event in past, futurewards if  
     event in future 
 
Results showed high levels of consistency within culture/language groups, 
but wide differences between them in the temporal frames adopted. The 
Swedish speakers preferred absolute frames, the Germans intrinsic, and the 
US English speakers were split between the two (albeit with a high 
proportion of intra-individual consistency in choices across both pairs of 
questions). Relative frames were largely absent in responses across all 
participants. Given that all three languages come from the same Proto-
Germanic root, Rothe-Wulf and colleagues (2014) posit that variation in 
cultural convention might account for the differences between speakers in 
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their preferred frames of reference and hence “…reference preferences do 
not come enclosed with the linguistic tools used to express them”. (2014: 8). 
 
 
Temporal succession 
 
Part and parcel of construing events, linguistically and mentally, is 
sequencing them in a given order of occurrence. The issue of whether our 
mental representation of temporal succession is influenced by linguistic 
space-time mappings has been subject to a number of studies. Macrae, 
Miles, and Best (2012) provide converging evidence from various 
experimental paradigms to demonstrate that the perception-action systems 
that govern movement through space also provide a scaffold for the mind’s 
journeys through time. They call this phenomenon ‘mental time travel’ 
(chronesthesia). They first point to case study evidence of a patient who 
suffered traumatic brain injury and was unable to recall memories of his 
own personal experiences, or contemplate future events that might be 
related to him personally (Tulving 1985). The patient’s semantic and short-
term memory, however, remained intact, pointing to a unique loss of 
episodic memory. The concomitant loss of the ability to project into the 
future, however, lead Macrae et al. to conclude that the patient had lost the 
ability to “travel through time” in either direction. Similar effects, though 
weaker and more gradual, occur in ageing, as well as in some mental illness. 
The link between past and future mental time travel is made further through 
references to work by Suddendorf (2010), who found that young children 
(3-4 year olds) who could correctly describe what they had done the day 
before were more able to generate future possibilities for the day after, to 
Spreng and Levine (2006), who found that in young adults imagined future 
scenarios are reportedly more vivid if they are set in the context of what is 
already perceptually familiar, and Buckner and Carroll (2007), who provide 
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evidence from brain imaging that also suggests that overlapping cortical 
regions are activated when thinking about the past or the future. 
In one experiment reported in Macrae et al. (2012), participants were 
presented with a target time on the screen before indicating with the mouse 
whether the time was in the past or the future. The words past and future 
were located on either the left or right of the screen on each trial, and 
Macrae et al. recorded the curvature of mouse movements towards the left 
or right. They hypothesised that participants would be most direct in their 
mouse movement towards past when it was on the left of the screen, and 
future when it was on the right. The results confirmed this hypothesis: there 
was a wider curvature (indicating less direct movement) in mouse 
trajectories to past when it was on the right and future when it was on the 
left. Macrae et al. conclude that the spatial information was an “attractor” 
for time information. However, Macrae et al. had in their introduction 
brought up Arabic-speakers right-to-left classification of time (as opposed to 
Roman script language: Tversky, Kugelmass, and Winter 1991). This result 
could be an artefact of reading direction, which is socio-cultural rather than 
metaphorical. Note that no information on participants’ language 
background is provided. Regardless, a learned socio-cultural explanation 
cannot be ruled out through this design even if all participants were 
monolingual English speakers. 
In another experiment, Macrae et al. (2012) sought to prime mental 
time travel through the illusion of movement. Participants performed an 
easy go-no go task that required them to click a mouse button when they 
saw a target but not when they saw a distractor. There were only six target 
presentations over the six-minute period of the task. The targets and 
distractors appeared on a screen that displayed vection, mimicking the 
environmental change that correlates with forwards or backwards movement 
and thus giving a sense of self-motion. The researchers expected that 
participants would “daydream” owing to the dullness of the task they were 
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performing, and hypothesised that when the vection display mimicked 
forwards motion, participants would be more inclined to prospect about the 
future, and when the display mimicked backwards motion, participants 
would be more inclined to prospect about the past. After the task, 
participants were asked to report the proportion of their thinking that related 
to the past or the future. Consistent with the hypothesis, future thoughts 
were more likely to accompany simulated ‘forwards’ motion, and past 
thoughts ‘backwards’ motion. This is a more robust methodology than the 
one used in the previous experiment, as reading direction is not a factor. 
However, neither is language, necessarily, since forwards motion in space 
correlates with forward motion in time for humans because we face the 
direction we move in (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980).  
Miles, Nind, and Macrae (2010) used mental time travel to 
investigate the processing of spatial information in conjunction with 
temporal information when one is engaged in thinking about the future or 
the past. Given other findings that abstract thought can be ‘embodied’ 
motorically, they reasoned that retrospection may be accompanied by 
backwards motion and prospection by forwards motion. Specifically, 
participants were asked to recall past events or imagine future ones while 
standing. The researchers surreptitiously measured the participants’ 
tendency to ‘sway’ or lean forwards or backwards using motion tracking 
technology while they were engaged in thinking about these past and future 
scenarios. Results showed that participants did indeed lean forwards when 
thinking about the future and lean backwards when thinking about the past. 
The researchers conclude that mental time travel “…appears to be grounded 
in the perception-action systems that support social-cognitive functioning. 
In this way, the embodiment of time and space yields an overt behavioural 
marker of an otherwise invisible mental operation”. (2010: 223). This is a 
very simple and elegant experiment, but the specific source of the finding is 
impossible to specify. Is the chronesthesia effect emergent and dependent on 
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linguistic metaphor per se, is the linguistic metaphor a mapping on a pre-
linguistic biological perception-action tendency, and if so, what determines 
the direction of the future-past polarity on the time axis, or is it all arbitrary 
and a matter of cultural practice? The next few paragraphs focus specifically 
on the possible role of cultural convention on metaphor comprehension and 
use. 
Two pieces of evidence point to the possibility that the directionality 
of the TIME IS SPACE metaphor is culture-specific. The first piece of 
evidence comes from the study of the mental construal of temporal 
succession in the Aymara people of South America. Núñez and Sweetser 
(2006) begin by underlining the apparent universality of both ego-/time 
moving metaphoric models and the conceptualization of time in terms of 
space. They add that, until the study of the Aymara language, all 
documented languages conceive of the future as ‘in front’ and the past as 
‘behind’. Aymara is an Amerindian language spoken in parts of Peru, 
Bolivia and Chile. It is, according to the authors, the first recorded case of 
the inverse of the future/front past/back mappings in all other languages 
studied to date. In Aymara, the basic word for ‘front’ (nayra, translated as 
“eye/front/sight”) is also the basic word for ‘past’, and ‘back’ (qhipa, 
“back/behind”) is a basic expression for future meaning. For example: 
 
(2) nayra    mara 
eye/sight/front  year 
‘last year’ 
 
Nayra is also used to mean ‘first’ (earliest) in an ordinal sequence (such as 
‘first’, ‘second, third’ etc.), and can mean ‘earlier than’ in a Time-RP sense, 
but not ‘earlier than now’ (Ego-RP). 
 
(3) qhipüru    
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CONTRACTED FORM OF: 
qhipa  uru 
back/behind day 
‘a future day’ 
 
Qhipa can also refer to positions in a sequence in a static, non-deictic 
structure, such as qhipa sata meaning ‘last planting’. The researchers also 
note that increasing bilingualism among Aymara speakers has led to the 
adoption of Spanish terms such as atrás (‘behind’), but consistent with the 
metaphor encoded in their native language, the Aymara use the term to 
mean ‘later’. In sum, Aymara speakers use nayra and qhipa to mean 
‘earlier’ and ‘later’ in Time-RP metaphors and also ‘past’ and ‘future’ in 
Ego-RP metaphors. However, in the Ego-RP metaphors, the ‘ego’ is not 
usually made explicit (e.g. ‘a future day’).  
Núñez and Sweetser (2006) collected data from gesture behaviour in 
order to corroborate their linguistic findings. Gesture is co-produced with 
speech, it is universal insofar as gesture-accompanying speech has been 
observed in all studied languages to date, it is less subject to ‘conscious’ 
control on the part of the speaker, and it has been argued to not only 
accompany but also complement and elaborate meaning (Cienki 1998). As 
part of their investigations, Núñez and Sweetser analysed Aymara gesture’s 
coherence with linguistic metaphoric mappings. Confirming the language 
data, they found that younger Aymara speakers with more experience with 
Spanish tended to use past/behind, future/front gesture patterns consistent 
with Spanish language spatio-temporal linguistic representations, whereas 
the older Aymara speakers with less contact with Spanish tended to use 
past/front, future/behind patterns consistent with Aymara spatio-temporal 
linguistic representations. Moreover, temporal distances were mapped onto 
greater gesturing angles, such that nearer times were closer to the ego and 
more distant times further. Like speakers of other languages, Aymara 
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gesture tended to use a left-right rather than sagittal mapping when talking 
about non-deictic time with no ego-reference-point. 
Why do Aymara speakers represent the past as in front and the 
future as behind? Núñez and Sweetser (2006) propose that the logic of 
KNOWLEDGE IS VISION metaphoric structure might be relevant. The authors 
postulate that Aymara speakers imagine static mappings of KNOWN IS IN 
FRONT OF EGO and UNKNOWN IS IN BACK OF EGO, rather than an ego-on-a-
path interpretation that where we have already been, rather than what we 
view ahead of us, is what is known. They suggest that part of the answer for 
this unusual case in world languages may lie in the importance of 
information sources in the grammar of Aymara, such that sentences are 
obligatorily marked for whether information was obtained first hand (e.g. 
‘seen’ by the speaker him or herself) or second hand (e.g. reported to the 
speaker). If this is the case, then the apparent cultural specificity of Aymara 
time conceptualization is essentially language-derived, and not a matter of 
cultural convention. 
The second piece of evidence of the cultural-specificity of the 
directionality of future and past comes from the study of individual 
differences in the mental construal of temporal succession. De la Fuente et 
al. (2014) investigated why some people have one or the other of these 
spatio-temporal mappings. The researchers studied Darija, a dialect of 
Arabic spoken in Morocco, and Spanish (from Spain). According to past, 
unpublished research by some of the same authors, Darija speakers gesture 
in front when talking about the past, while Spanish speakers tend to gesture 
in front when talking about the future. Interestingly, both languages use 
future-in-front and past-behind metaphors – it is the co-speech gestures that 
vary in Darija speakers. The researchers suggest a dissociation between how 
Darija speakers might think about time and how they speak about time. 
They (2014) carried out a series of experiments, all employing the basic 
paradigm of the ‘temporal diagram’, a bird-eye view of a human avatar 
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facing forwards (upwards), with one box in front of him and one behind 
him. Participants were told of one event that happened in 
Juan/Mohammed’s past, and one in his future, and were asked to write them 
in the boxes. In the first experiment, the majority of Spanish speakers put 
the future event in the ‘front’ box and the past event in the box ‘behind’, but 
the Moroccan Darija speakers did the opposite.  
Thus while Spanish speakers seem to employ the future-in-front 
mental mapping, the Darija speakers, like the Aymara speakers, appear to 
employ the KNOWLEDGE IS SEEING metaphor in their mental mappings of 
temporal succession. However, the authors propose a cultural explanation 
for this finding that they test in experiment 2. The researchers argue that 
Moroccans place greater value on tradition, and the Spanish on progress. 
They hypothesised that such culture-specific attitudes might account for the 
differing spatio-temporal patterning. They call it the temporal focus 
hypothesis. In experiment 2, a questionnaire established that the Moroccans 
agreed more with past-focused statements (e.g. “The young people must 
preserve the traditions”) and the Spanish-speakers agreed more with future-
focused statements (e.g. “Technological and economic advances are good 
for society”). Based on the findings from experiment 2, in experiment 3 the 
researchers predicted that temporal focus should play a role also within-
culture, and compared Spanish senior citizens with Spanish university 
students in the temporal diagram task. As before, the majority of the young 
adult Spaniards put the future event as ‘in front’ and the past event as 
‘behind’ the avatar. The older Spaniards, however, performed at chance 
levels. However, without corroborating questionnaire evidence regarding 
individual participants’ own ‘temporal foci’, this is a comparison by age, or 
by experience with experimental design (presumably the students were 
psychology students), not directly supporting the temporal focus hypothesis. 
This does not make the age differences uninteresting, but it does not support 
the temporal focus hypothesis without also showing that the older group 
21 
 
were more past-focused. The mean age of 76 years also leaves open the 
possibility of variation in performance on the diagram task owing to 
unfamiliarity with tasks of this type (hence the chance finding). No data is 
provided regarding whether the older group tended to match the order of 
mention of the events to their placement in the boxes. Also, an at-chance 
response finding does not mean that the older group is more past focused, it 
just means they are not focused one way or another, if it means anything 
about temporal focus at all.  
In experiment 4, de la Fuente et al. (2014) compared three groups: 
Spanish university students, older Spaniards (M = 73 years) and Moroccan 
students at university in Morocco, The temporal focus questionnaire 
replicated the future-focus of the younger Spaniards and the past-focus of 
the Moroccans found earlier. The older Spaniards showed no bias one way 
or another, and in fact appeared to have a higher level of ‘agreement’ with 
the statements overall (indicated by similar levels of past focus to the young 
Moroccans and future-focus to the younger Spaniards). The results of the 
temporal diagram task were equivocal. As before, the younger Spaniards put 
the future event ‘in front’ more often than behind the avatar, whereas the 
Moroccans did the opposite. The older Spaniards were reportedly at an 
“intermediate” place between the two in terms of performance, as they were 
less likely to put the future event ‘in front’ than the younger Spaniards, but 
more likely to do so than the young Moroccans. Although the researchers 
claim the older Spaniards performed at an “intermediate” level between the 
other two groups, they were significantly more likely to put the future event 
in front of the avatar than behind it, much like the younger Spaniards. This 
group of older Spaniards did not perform at chance levels like the group in 
the previous experiment. The researchers suggest age and independent 
living were factors in this (the older group in experiment 3 was in assisted 
living) - this group of older Spaniards was younger than the group in the 
previous task, and may therefore have been more future-focused, but the 
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mean difference was a mere 3 years, between 76 and 73. More significantly, 
participants’ temporal focus (past or future) on the questionnaire was a 
significant predictor of responses on the temporal diagram task. That is, 
those participants that tended to place the past in front in the temporal 
diagram task tended to also give more past-oriented responses in the 
temporal focus questionnaire, and those participants that tended to place the 
future in front also tended to give more future-oriented responses in the 
questionnaire. However, it is notable that this result was based on an 
analysis of all participants collapsed over culture and age. Given the almost 
identical propensity to agree with past and future statements in the older 
Spanish group, it is not clear that an analysis of these participants alone 
would corroborate a link between temporal focus and temporal diagram 
responses.  
In their final experiment, de la Fuente et al. (2014) attempted to 
establish a causal link between temporal focus and behaviour in the 
temporal diagram task. Spanish university students were primed to be more 
past- or future-focused by means of a writing exercise prior to the diagram 
task. This ‘training’ session involved written responses to ten questions that 
focussed entirely on the past (e.g. “Were you happy as a child?”) or the 
future (e.g. “Do you think you will be happy as an old person?”). ‘Future-
focus’ training led to a small but significant increase in the tendency to 
place the future event in the ‘front’ box (compared to the combined results 
from the same population in the previous experiments), whereas ‘past-
focus’ training led to chance-level performance on the diagram – 
significantly different from the future-trained group. The researchers argue 
that even a small amount of context-training can alter space-time mappings, 
and argue that temporal focus can play a causal role in the spatialization of 
time. 
While the rigorous study of de la Fuente et al. (2014) points to the 
role of individual cultural differences in temporal focus rather than 
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linguistic metaphor per se, there remain a few issues with their approach 
that future studies may address. For example, a much more ecologically 
valid and less conscious behavioural measure would be to study speech 
accompanying gestures like Núñez and Sweetser (2006) did for Aymara 
speakers. This would reflect real-life behaviour and, if correlations with 
temporal focus and gesture patterns were shown as in De la Fuente et al.’s 
(2014) 4th and 5th experiments, this would establish the temporal focus 
hypothesis as a strong determinant of the directionality of spatialization of 
time in individuals. Another issue concerns the generalizability of those 
results to other cultures. Are Moroccans the only past-focused culture? Is it 
all Moroccans? If not, why? What is the definition of a past-focused 
culture? Is Japan past-focused socially and future-focused technologically 
and economically? Would we predict different spatialization of time for 
different domains of experience within a culture? Clearly, this is an area of 
investigation still in need of much empirical evidence in order for firm 
conclusions to be drawn. 
Thus far, all the afore-mentioned studies have looked at the construal 
of temporal succession on a horizontal axis. However, there is cross-
linguistic evidence that temporal succession can also be construed vertically 
(e.g., Boroditsky 2001; Boroditsky, Fuhrman, and McCormick 2011). Miles, 
Tan, Noble, Lumsden, and Macrae (2011) investigated the possibility that 
Mandarin-English bilinguals possess two spatio-temporal mappings. 
Whereas in English time is represented metaphorically as a horizontal 
continuum from left to right (past to future), in Mandarin the metaphor is 
equivalent but on a vertical axis (up for past, down for future). Mandarin 
speakers have been reported to more efficiently process temporal 
information when it is organised vertically and English speakers when it is 
organised horizontally (Boroditsky 2001). The suggestion, according to 
Miles et al. is that sociolinguistic conventions influence temporal 
representations. In experiment 1, bilingual Mandarin-English and 
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monolingual English participants were shown images of buildings from the 
past or future (science-fiction scenes) and responded past or future by 
means of a button press on the number keypad. In horizontal blocks, past 
and future were located on either the left and right of the screen respectively 
(compatible), or the right and left respectively (incompatible), and the keys 
to be pressed were to the left (4) and right (6) of the central ‘5’. On the 
vertical blocks past and future were located at the top and bottom edges 
respectively (compatible) or bottom and top respectively (incompatible) and 
the keys were above (2) or below (8) the central ‘5’. There were four blocks, 
one for each condition, in a 2 (horizontal vs. vertical) x 2 (compatible vs. 
incompatible) design. Results showed that the monolingual English speakers 
were faster on compatible than incompatible trials on the horizontal axis but 
not the vertical. The bilingual Mandarin-English speakers were faster on 
compatible than incompatible trials across both horizontal and vertical axes, 
and overall faster on the horizontal axis than the vertical. The authors 
concluded that “it appears that the language one speaks can indeed influence 
how one thinks about time, such that bilinguals possess two mental time 
lines” (2011: 601). However, the authors present no direct evidence that 
language and not some other factor is the source for their findings. Reading 
direction is the obvious one, since Chinese uses vertical directionality of 
writing.  
In experiment 2, Mandarin-English bilinguals were asked to sort 
three pictures of a famous person into a self-chosen order. The pictures were 
of Jet Li (a famous Chinese actor) and Brad Pitt (a famous American actor). 
Each was a portrait of the actor as a young man, an old man (with special 
effects), and an intermediate age between the two. Testing was in English, 
and the experimenter first placed the intermediate picture in the middle of a 
square board. Results showed that Mandarin-English bilinguals tended to 
sort the pictures of Brad Pitt (priming a Western cultural context) from left 
to right, and Jet Li (priming a Chinese cultural context) from top to bottom. 
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Again, the authors are unclear about the underlying cause of this effect. 
They claim that it is an effect of linguistic metaphor on thinking, and 
conclude by saying that reading direction does not provide a sufficient 
explanation for the effects found, since Singaporean Chinese is also written 
horizontally in Singapore (where the bilinguals came from). But they add in 
a footnote that Singaporeans are exposed to the traditional vertical 
arrangement of Chinese letters in their daily lives. So it appears to be 
impossible to disentangle the relative influence of writing direction and 
linguistic metaphor on time conceptualization in this study. Obviously, 
finding a language with vertical metaphors but exclusively horizontal 
writing direction (or vice versa) would provide a more conclusive test-case, 
but such a language might be difficult to find because it is also possible that 
directionality of writing is itself influenced by vertical time metaphors (or 
vice versa). 
 
 
Duration estimation 
 
Another basic aspect of temporal cognition relates to estimating the duration 
of a given event, which is relevant for, for instance, event individuation and 
sequencing. Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008) examined duration perception 
to test the potentially asymmetrical cross-dimensional relationship between 
space and time. They based their hypothesis, namely that space would 
influence time more than time would influence space, on the relative 
prevalence of spatial linguistic metaphors of time (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, 1999; see also studies reviewed above). In a series of experiments, 
participants saw straight lines that ‘grew’ from left to right on a screen. 
They were asked to make one of two judgments for each line that they saw, 
specifically (i) how long the line was when it reached full length (spatial 
judgment), or (ii) how long it took for the line to reach its full length (time 
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judgment). The final displacements and the speed with which the lines grew 
varied between trials. Spatially shorter lines were perceived to have taken a 
shorter time to reach full length, but a fast-growing line was not conversely 
perceived to be spatially longer. The results showed that participants were 
influenced by the spatial length of the line when making time estimations, 
but were not influenced by the time it took for the line to reach its final 
length when making space judgments. This effect persisted regardless of 
whether participants were primed as to which judgment (time or space) they 
needed to make before or after the trial began, and it also persisted when the 
line did not ‘grow’ but simply appeared on screen for varying durations. 
Casasanto and Boroditsky concluded that space and time are related 
asymmetrically, and provided evidence for the psychological reality of a 
basic tenet of CMT: mental representations of intangible phenomena (such 
as time) may be partially parasitic upon more concrete experiences (such as 
space).  
Casasanto (2008; see also 2005) investigated time as ‘distance’ and 
time as ‘quantity’ metaphors. While English and Indonesian prefer distance 
metaphors to express time duration (e.g. a long meeting, a party of short 
duration), Greek and Spanish prefer to express duration by means of 
quantity expressions (e.g. a big meeting, a party of small duration). It is 
noteworthy that the measurement of whether a language was distance- or 
quantity biased was based on the ratio of collocations on a Google search. 
For example, quantity expressions to refer to duration were overwhelmingly 
more frequent than distance durations in the corpus in Greek speakers, and 
vice versa for English speakers. These naturally occurring tendencies in the 
language corpus were corroborated in a questionnaire asking participants to 
rate their preference for distance based and quantity based collocations to 
refer to temporal duration. Participants rated the expressions roughly in-line 
with expectations created by the Google data for each of their specific 
languages. 
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Based on the corpus and questionnaire evidence, the next step in 
Casasanto’s (2005) investigation focused on whether the prevalence of 
distance or quantity metaphors of time in speakers of English, Spanish, 
Indonesian and Greek would correspond to greater interference from linear 
or three-dimensional (quantity) input while estimating durations of events. 
Casasanto employed a ‘filling tank’ condition to create a ‘quantity’ 
interference task alongside the ‘growing line’ tasks for distance interference 
used in Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008). Casasanto predicted that different 
linguistic representations between languages should therefore lead to 
different spatio-temporal relationships. Such an outcome, Casasanto argued, 
could constitute evidence of a “deep” effect of language on non-linguistic 
representation. He specifically predicted that speakers of English and 
Indonesian, who use distance spatial metaphors of time, would show greater 
interference from the spatial (distance) information contained in the 
‘growing line’ task than the Spanish and Greek speakers, who in turn would 
instead show greater interference from the spatial (quantity) information 
contained in the ‘filling tank’ task than the English and Indonesian speakers. 
As predicted, English and Indonesian speakers were strongly influenced by 
line length in their time duration judgments but only weakly influenced by 
tank ‘fullness’, whereas the Greek and Spanish speakers showed the 
opposite pattern; a strong influence of quantity and only a weak effect of 
distance. The effect of duration on space estimation did not reach 
significance, with the exception of the filling tanks task in Indonesian 
speakers: the time it took to fill the tank to its maximal level correlated with 
the ‘fullness’ estimations that Indonesian speakers gave. However, this was 
the only ‘reverse’ case of time showing a significant influence on space. 
A further experiment examined whether temporal duration 
metaphors in language had a causal role in duration estimations. To this end, 
Casasanto (2005) devised an experimental task to train English-speaking 
participants to think like Greek speakers when estimating time. Two groups 
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of English native speakers were trained in either distance (the English 
preference) or quantity (the Greek preference) metaphors. The training 
required participants to use either the adjectives long/short (distance 
training) or more/less (quantity training) in filling in gaps before nouns 
describing physical objects or events. For example, in the ‘distance training’ 
group participants had to fill in the gap “A sneeze is ___ than a vacation” 
using shorter/longer, while the ‘quantity training’ group had to use 
more/less. All participants then performed the filling tank task (see previous 
paragraph). The outcome of the training task was that the group of 
participants who had received quantity training showed a significant 
quantity interference effect, but those who received the ‘distance training’ 
(or no training, cf. the prior experiments) did not. 
Casasanto (2010) discusses the experimental evidence above as 
casting new light to metaphor theory in terms of the potential relationship 
between language and abstract thought. Casasanto argues for the use of 
spatial representations to conceptualise time even when language is not used 
(what he calls the “deep” view of the relationship between language and 
abstract thought) versus the “Thinking for Speaking”, or “shallow”, view of 
language as influencing thought only when language is involved (such as 
when planning speech or when comprehending language). The experiments 
on temporal duration by Casasanto and colleagues suggest that frequency of 
usage of specific distance or quantity duration metaphors in a specific 
language may adjust and strengthen time-distance or time-quantity 
mappings in these (and potentially other) populations. Casasanto claims that 
these results are inconsistent with a “shallow” view of language influencing 
thought only when “thinking for speaking” (Slobin 1996). However, the 
results from the final training experiment point to the ease with which a 
short period of induced ‘quantity bias’ could cause lifelong biases in English 
speakers to shift towards the biases of Greek and Spanish speakers. The 
corollary of this is that the effect of a lifelong experience with language-
29 
 
based metaphor bias is very easily overcome, something which might also 
be viewed as inconsistent with a “deep” view of the language-thought 
relationship.  
A somewhat different approach to the mental representation of 
temporal duration is taken in a recent study by Alards-Tomalin, Leboe-
McGowan, Shaw, and Leboe-McGowan (2014), who investigated the 
potential for different magnitudes and magnitude codes, specifically 
number, size and colour saturation stimuli to interfere with time perception. 
They base their predictions on three effects. The ‘kappa’ effect (Cohen, 
Hansel, and Sylvester 1953; Sarrazin, Giraudo, Pailhous, and Bootsma 
2004) posits that varying relative physical distances between three 
sequentially-presented stimuli (A, X, and B) can bias time duration 
judgments of the two intervals they create (AX and XB), such that longer 
physical distances lead to perceptions of longer time intervals. The Spatial-
Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) effect (Dahaene, 
Bossini, and Giraux 1993) contends that people from Western cultures have 
a left-to-right/low-to-high line of mental representation of magnitude. 
Likewise, shorter times are related to left-sided responses and longer times 
to right-handed ones (the Spatial-Temporal Association of Response Codes 
(STARC); Vallesi, Binns, and Shallice 2008). 
In the first experiment, participants saw three digits presented one at 
a time in sequence. The first and third (final) numbers in the sequence were 
always 1 and 9 (or 9 and 1 in a reverse-order condition), so the second digit 
controlled the relative numerical ‘distances’ (henceforth ‘magnitude’) of the 
two intervals. For example, participants might see a 1,2,9 sequence, with 
two blank intervals either side of the ‘2’. In this case, the magnitude of the 
difference was smaller in the first interval than the second. In terms of 
duration, the ‘long’ intervals ranged between 735ms to 785ms, and the 
‘short’ 635ms to 685ms, and four time differences between interval pairs 
were created (150ms, 117ms, 84ms, and 50ms). The actual number stimuli 
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themselves appeared for a fixed duration of 200ms each. Participants 
correctly rated more long-short interval patterns as long-short (and vice-
versa), and their accuracy in doing so increased as the disparity between the 
durations of the two intervals grew. Additionally, and as predicted, the 
relative difference in the magnitudes of each interval also influenced results, 
such that smaller differences (e.g. 1,2 or 8,9) were perceived to be of shorter 
duration and larger differences (e.g. 2,9 or 1,8) perceived to be of longer 
duration. In a second experiment, this result held even when the sequence of 
numbers was manipulated within-subjects to be either ordered (as 
previously) or non-ordered and not ‘book-ended’ by the lowest and highest 
digits ‘1’ and ‘9’ (e.g. 2,1,8 and 2,9,8). 
In a similar experiment with discs of four different sizes instead of 
numbers, participants again had to judge whether the intervals between the 
stimuli pairs AX and XB were long-short or short-long. This time, it was 
hypothesised that participants would be influenced by the magnitude of the 
size difference between the pairs of stimuli that made up AX and XB in a 
similar way that they were influenced by the size of the numerical 
differences in experiment 1. As expected, the proportion of long-short 
responses was lower than the proportion of short-long responses on trials 
where the size difference between disc A and disc X was smaller than the 
size difference between disc X and disc B. In other words, participants 
perceived intervals between two discs with a wider disparity in relative size 
as longer in duration than the interval between two discs with a smaller size 
difference. In another experiment, same-sized discs with one of four 
magnitudes of blue colour saturation were used. Again in line with the 
predictions, participants perceived the intervals between discs of a relatively 
similar level of colour saturation (e.g. light blue vs. medium light blue) to be 
shorter in duration than the interval between discs with a perceptually 
stronger saturation difference (e.g. light blue vs. medium dark blue). 
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There were a number of unexpected interactions. In the ‘size’ 
experiment, participants who received non-linear size sequences of disc 
sizes (i.e., disc sizes did not consistently increase or consistently decrease 
across the three stimulus presentations) were less accurate at making 
interval duration judgments than participants who received ordered 
sequences. Additionally, when the stimuli decreased in size across the trial, 
participants were more likely to classify the intervals as long-short than 
short-long. The researchers suggest these effects could be due to potential 
‘depth’ interference, with the discs appearing to ‘approach’ or ‘recede’ in 
the ordered condition compared to the non-ordered sequences. In the colour 
saturation experiment, when presented with low then high-saturation 
sequences, participants who received the non-ordered condition were more 
likely to give short-long responses than participants in the ordered 
condition. 
The researchers conclude that magnitude variation of number, size 
and colour saturation can bias time perceptions. Specifically, they posit the 
potential for closely-related stimuli (e.g. the number ‘1’ and ‘2’) to be 
initially integrated, possibly for purposes of efficient processing, and that 
there may be a shared “mental magnitude line” that is recruited for some 
spatial, magnitude and time information, and hence these stimulus 
integrations, and more general experiential links (e.g. ‘more’ distance 
typically coincides with ‘more’ time) may produce cross-dimensional 
interference. The series of experiments reported by Alards-Tomalin et al. 
(2014) show that linguistic metaphors of the kind studied by Casasanto and 
colleagues may not be the only elements affecting conceptual metaphors 
such as TIME IS SPACE. Such conceptual metaphors may also be affected by 
non-linguistic experiential elements such as dimensions of magnitude in 
numbers, size, and colour saturation. It remains to be seen whether these 
separable influences of language and non-linguistic experience present with 
any cross-linguistic and cross-cultural variation.  
32 
 
Indeed, the recent study by Sinha, Sinha, Zinken, and Sampaio 
(2011) challenges both the idea that the TIME IS SPACE metaphor is 
universal, and the idea that it is pre-linguistic or innate. Sinha et al. (2011) 
also suggest that the reason for the preponderance of spatio-temporal 
metaphors in most languages is in large part due to cultural-historical 
“cognitive artefacts” such as calendars and clocks that ‘anchor’ time 
schematization and introduce numeric symbolic processes and linear 
number lines into language (the “Mediated Mapping Hypothesis”). In a 
sense, this process conceives of time as “abstracted from the events [that 
occur in time] themselves” (2011: 141). Sinha et al. define “Time as Such” 
as this abstract, linear, and autonomous domain of time. They define “time-
based intervals” as segmentations defined by the boundaries of “Time as 
Such”. They are different, therefore, from event-based time intervals such as 
‘sunrise’. Cognitive schematization of “Time as Such” is not expressed by 
calendars and clocks, but is reliant on them. They may be motivated by 
nature, but they are not determined by it. Examples include conventions 
such as the days of the week. Sinha et al. describe some cultures which do 
not measure “Time as Such” but instead use an event-based schema. The 
Nuer do not count or measure units of abstract time but instead view ‘time’ 
as a succession of events, cycles, and social activity rhythms (though the 
authors point out they do have a ‘quasi-calendar’ of 12 months, which can 
be enumerated). The Ainu have a ‘qualitative’ rather than quantitative 
‘measure’ of time, again largely event-based. 
Sinha et al.’s (2011) study focused specifically on the Amondawa 
people. The Amondawa are an indigenous Amazonian tribe of around a 
hundred people, the majority of whom are now bilingual (Amondawan-
Portuguese). They have only four numeral terms, the first two of which (1 
and 2) can be considered ‘basic’. There is no term for abstract ‘time’, and no 
recorded instance of numerals denoting time intervals. There is a lexicon 
around time intervals (‘sun’, ‘night’, ‘morning’, tomorrow’, etc.), but no 
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words for weeks, months, or years. Linguistically, time is split into two 
seasons, which in turn are subdivided into beginning-, middle-, and end-of 
season parts. Sinha et al. give the example of the Amondawa naming system 
as indicative of the absence of a numerical calendric system. The 
Amondawa change their names many times throughout their lifespan 
according to a sort of ‘life stage’ defined by ‘age’ (roughly – not 
numerically conceived), social role, gender, and moiety (group). The change 
of name of a younger person, or the birth of a new child, can lead to a 
cascade of name changes ‘down the line’. All names come from a finite 
store, and hence names are informative about people’s lives. 
When asked to place paper plates representing intervals of time in a 
‘time map’ on the floor, Amondawan participants laid the plates out either 
left-to-right or right-to-left. The researchers note that the eventual 
curvilinear layout of the plates is difficult to ‘read’, since it could be an 
artefact of physical reach. However, the plates were not ‘ordered’ cyclically 
or rectilinearly. Similar results were found when participants were asked to 
describe the diurnal cycle. Lexical terms for ‘day’ and some subdivisions 
were provided, but again no cyclical form was created, and when a circle 
was used to explain the purpose of the task, the participants still avoided the 
shape. It does appear, however, that participants may have laid one next to 
the other one by one in a cumulative or linear fashion at least, even though 
the ‘lines’ themselves were perhaps somewhat ‘shapeless’. That is, the 
plates may not have been simply ‘scattered’ in random locations. 
Amondawa does, of course, have spatial and motion language, but 
simply doesn’t map locative or motion terms onto time except in cases 
where spatial motion is made contextually explicit, such as when presenting 
the motion of objects that denote time. Their bilingualism in Portuguese 
may also be affecting their behaviour in this regard. The researchers cite this 
as evidence that in Amondawa there are no linguistic restrictions on the 
spatial mapping of time. They also state that they investigated only 
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mappings that posit a reference point – they therefore make no claim about 
spatial language for other senses of time, such as ‘long’ for duration. The 
researchers conclude that the Amondawa only use spatial terms to describe 
time if ‘artificially induced’. They stress that the Amondawa are not a 
“people without time” (Sinha et al. 2011: 160), as these speakers 
linguistically express inter-event relationships and can talk about the past, 
present and future. They clearly have the capacity talk about time in terms 
of space, but they are not in the practice of doing so. “Time as Such” is a 
construct of culture, history and language, and is not a construct of space, or 
universal. When spatial language is recruited to talk about time, it is by 
“inter-domain analogic correlation” (2011: 163). Spatial metaphor of time is 
therefore not universal because it relies on “Time as Such” to be expressed. 
Condensed into a sentence, Sinha et al. posit that without calendric (or 
similar) numerical conventions of abstract time to mediate between them as 
a kind of super-ordinate category, time would not be represented in terms of 
space. Converging evidence from other similar languages and cultures, or 
from training paradigms such as the ones used by Casasanto (see previous 
paragraphs in this section) would be very useful in corroborating the 
authors’ claims. At the moment, this study leaves a few important questions 
unanswered, the most important of which is the consistent finding of the 
asymmetrical relationship between space and time (cf. Boroditsky’s and 
colleagues’ studies reviewed here). What does Sinha et al.’s theory do to 
explain the apparent asymmetrical relationship of time and space 
representation? If “Time as Such” is the conduit by which space and time 
become connected, and this is achieved through number-based correlative 
analogy, why does space affect time more than time affects space? 
 
 
Conclusion 
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The studies on the mental representation of time reviewed above provide 
important insights into the psychological reality of spatio-temporal 
metaphors. A large part of the evidence does lend support to the TIME IS 
SPACE metaphor. From an associative learning perspective, this suggests 
that the use of a linguistic metaphor for time activates the corresponding 
mental metaphor, and as a result this particular associative mapping is 
strengthened (Casasanto, 2008). The strengthening of the associative 
mapping is then relative to the frequency with which a given metaphor is 
used. As seen in Casasanto (2008), more frequently used metaphors for 
duration (e.g. distance-based in English, as opposed to amount-based in 
Greek) exert a measurably greater influence on the perception and 
reproduction of time. However, what has become clear from the review is 
also that the mental representation of phenomena as complex as time or 
temporal relations is not solely determined by linguistic form. As several 
studies have shown, linguistic space-time mappings may be overridden by 
cultural conventions. This is evident in, for instance, Rothe-Wulf et al.’s 
(2014) study, where the actual linguistic expressions for motion through 
time are similar across the languages investigated, but yet give rise to 
different temporal conceptions. Further evidence in this regard is offered by 
de la Fuente and colleagues (2014), who showed that attentional focus 
(towards the past or the future) influences the implicit spatialization of time, 
regardless of linguistic time-space mappings. Sinha et al.’s (2011) findings 
on non-spatialized time expressions dovetail with these findings on cultural 
influences on the mental representation of time, showing that although space 
is a common source domain for temporal language (and in extension for 
temporal thought), it is not universal (see also Levinson and Majid, 2013). 
Taken together, the evidence available to date suggests that the mental 
representation of time in humans is the outcome of an intricate interplay 
between linguistic (i.e. metaphors) and cultural conventions. An essential 
task for future inquiry consists of further exploring the specific processes of 
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weighting and competition that underlie this interplay. It is far from clear 
whether metaphors in language are so powerful that they can override time 
construal derived through cultural convention, or whether the relationship 
between linguistically derived and culturally derived metaphor is one of 
coexistence rather than competition. If the latter, then further research is 
needed to elucidate the contexts that promote one or the other type of 
metaphor usage. And if cultural convention has an important role to play in 
the psychological reality of spatio-temporal metaphors, then investigations 
need to better account for how this convention is constructed and utilized 
among a cultural group not only synchronically, but also diachronically, to 
thus shed light on how these cultural conventions come into existence in the 
first place.  
 
Acknowledgements 
The work on this paper was supported by the Swedish Research Council 
(grant nr 421-2010-2104). Part of this paper was given as a plenary lecture 
by the 1st author at the 1st Conference on Figurative Thought and Language, 
Thessalokini, Greece, April 2014, organized by the Thessaloniki Cognitive 
Linguistics Research group. 
 
 
References 
 
Alards-Tomalin, D., Leboe-McGowan, J. P., Shaw, J. D. M., & Leboe-McGowan, 
L. C. 2014. The effects of numerical magnitude, size, and color saturation 
on perceived interval duration. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40(2), 555–566. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0035031 
Bender, A., Beller, S., & Bennardo, G. 2010. Temporal frames of reference: 
Conceptual analysis and empirical evidence from German, English, 
37 
 
Mandarin Chinese and Tongan. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 10(3), 
283–307. doi:10.1163/156853710X531195. 
Boroditsky, L. 2000. Metaphoric structuring: Understanding time through spatial 
metaphors. Cognition, 75(1), 1–28. 
Boroditsky, L. 2001. Does language shape thought?: Mandarin and English 
speakers’ conceptions of time. Cognitive Psychology, 43(1), 1–22. 
http://doi.org/10.1006/cogp.2001.0748 
Boroditsky, L., Fuhrman, O., & McCormick, K. 2011. Do English and Mandarin 
speakers think about time differently? Cognition, 118(1), 123–129. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2010.09.010 
Buckner, R. L., & Carroll, D. C. 2007. Self-projection and the brain. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 49–57. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.004 
Casasanto, D. 2005. Perceptual foundations of abstract thought. Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
Casasanto, D. 2008. Who’s afraid of the big bad Whorf? Crosslinguistic 
differences in temporal language and thought. Language Learning, 58(s1), 
63–79. 
Casasanto, D. 2010. Space for thinking. In V. Evans & P. Chilton (Eds.), 
Language, Cognition and Space: The State of the Art and New Directions 
(453–478). London: Equinox. 
Casasanto, D., & Boroditsky, L. 2008. Time in the mind: Using space to think 
about time. Cognition, 106(2), 579–593. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.03.004 
Cienki, A. 1998. Metaphoric gestures and some of their relations to verbal 
metaphoric expressions. Discourse and Cognition: Bridging the Gap, 189–
204. 
Clark, H. H. 1973. Space, time, semantics, and the child. In T. Moore (Ed.), 
Cognitive development and the acquisition of language (27–63). New 
York: Academic Press. 
Cohen, J., Hansel, C., & Sylvester, J. D. 1953. A new phenomenon in time 
judgment. Nature, 172, 901–903. 
Comrie, B. 1976. Aspect. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Comrie, B. 1985. Tense. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
38 
 
Dahl, Ö. 2000. Tense and aspect in the languages of Europe. Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter. 
Dehaene, S., Bossini, S., & Giraux, P. 1993. The mental representation of parity 
and number magnitude. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
122(3), 371–396. 
De la Fuente, J., Santiago, J., Roman, A., Dumitrache, C., & Casasanto, D. 2014. 
When you think about it, your past is in front of you: How culture shapes 
spatial conceptions of time. Psychological Science, 25(9), 1682–1690. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614534695 
Evans, V. 2004. How we conceptualise time: Language, meaning and temporal 
cognition. Essays in Arts and Sciences, 33(2), 13. 
Evans, V. 2013. Language and time: A cognitive linguistics approach. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gentner, D., Imai, M., & Boroditsky, L. 2002. As time goes by: Evidence for two 
systems in processing space → time metaphors. Language and Cognitive 
Processes, 17(5), 537–565. http://doi.org/10.1080/01690960143000317 
Jackendoff, R. 1983. Semantics and cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. 1999. Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and 
its challenge to Western thought. Basic Books. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. 2003. Metaphors We Live By. 1980. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Levinson, S. C. 2003. Space in Language and Cognition: Explorations in 
Cognitive Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Levinson, S. C., & Majid, A. 2013. The island of time: Yélî Dnye, the language of 
Rossel Island. Cultural Psychology, 4, 61. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00061 
Macrae, C. N., Miles, L. K., & Best, S. B. 2012. Moving through time. Mental time 
travel and social behavior. In J. P. Forgas, K. Fiedler & C. Sedikides 
(Eds.), Social Thinking and Interpersonal Behavior (113–126). New York: 
Psychology Press. 
39 
 
McGlone, M. S., & Harding, J. L. 1998. Back (or forward?) to the future: The role 
of perspective in temporal language comprehension. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 24(5), 
1211–1223. http://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.24.5.1211 
Miles, L. K., Nind, L. K., & Macrae, C. N. 2010. Moving through time. 
Psychological Science, 21(2), 222–223. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797609359333 
Miles, L. K., Tan, L., Noble, G. D., Lumsden, J., & Macrae, C. N. 2011. Can a 
mind have two time lines? Exploring space–time mapping in Mandarin and 
English speakers. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 18(3), 598–604. 
http://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-011-0068-y 
Moore, K. E. 2006. Space-to-time mappings and temporal concepts. Cognitive 
Linguistics, 17(2), 199–244. http://doi.org/10.1515/COG.2006.005 
Núñez, R. E., Motz, B. A., & Teuscher, U. 2006. Time after time: The 
psychological reality of the ego-and time-reference-point distinction in 
metaphorical construals of time. Metaphor and Symbol, 21(3), 133–146. 
Núñez, R. E., & Sweetser, E. 2006. With the future behind them: Convergent 
evidence from Aymara language and gesture in the crosslinguistic 
comparison of spatial construals of time. Cognitive Science, 30(3), 401–
450. 
Rothe-Wulf, A., Beller, S., & Bender, A. 2014. Temporal frames of reference in 
three Germanic languages: Individual consistency, interindividual 
consensus, and cross-linguistic variability. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 1–23. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2014.970205 
Sarrazin, J.-C., Giraudo, M.-D., Pailhous, J., & Bootsma, R. J. 2004. Dynamics of 
Balancing Space and Time in Memory: Tau and Kappa Effects Revisited. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 30(3), 411–430. http://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.30.3.411 
Sinha, C., Sinha, V. D. S., Zinken, J., & Sampaio, W. 2011. When time is not 
space: the social and linguistic construction of time intervals and temporal 
event relations in an Amazonian culture. Language and Cognition, 3(1), 
137–169. 
40 
 
Slobin, D. I. 1996. From “thought and language” to “thinking for speaking”. 
Rethinking Linguistic Relativity, 17, 70–96. 
Spreng, R. N., & Levine, B. 2006. The temporal distribution of past and future 
autobiographical events across the lifespan. Memory & Cognition, 34(8), 
1644–1651. 
Suddendorf, T. 2010. Linking yesterday and tomorrow: Preschoolers’ ability to 
report temporally displaced events. British Journal of Developmental 
Psychology, 28(2), 491–498. http://doi.org/10.1348/026151009X479169 
Traugott, E. C. 1978. On the expression of spatio-temporal relations in language. 
Universals of Human Language, 3, 369–400. 
Tulving, E. 1985. Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie 
Canadienne, 26(1), 1–12. http://doi.org/10.1037/h0080017 
Tversky, B., Kugelmass, S., & Winter, A. 1991. Cross-cultural and developmental 
trends in graphic productions. Cognitive Psychology, 23(4), 515–557. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(91)90005-9 
Vallesi, A., Binns, M. A., & Shallice, T. 2008. An effect of spatial–temporal 
association of response codes: Understanding the cognitive representations 
of time. Cognition, 107(2), 501–527. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.10.011 
 
